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Abstract 
This paper examines popular and widespread mistrust of large-scale capitalism, and its 
potential for disloyalty to the post-1965 Rhodesian state, by the white middle class and small-
scale capitalists in Rhodesia. It focuses on the relationship between Roland ‘Tiny’ Rowland, 
managing-director of the multinational Lonrho company, and Wilfred Brooks, the editor of 
the largest business/trade journal in Rhodesia, Rhodesian Property & Finance. This case is 
augmented with observations on the role and actions of other multinationals such as the 
Anglo American Corporation and the newspaper conglomerate of the Argus Press, which 
illustrate how white, urban, small-scale capital responded to the political changes underway. 
A close reading of Property & Finance in the early 1960s suggests there was a general fear of 
large-scale business enterprise without firm Rhodesian roots. As the 1960s progressed, this 
fear morphed into concerns of big businesses’ relationship with African nationalists and the 
pan-African movement. Many saw these companies as too friendly with new African political 
entities. In particular, Rowland’s willingness to work with independent Africa, and 
particularly the Organisation of African Unity, was of crucial importance in shaping the way 
in which Property & Finance engaged with Lonrho’s business activities. These findings 
illustrate key divisions within the white community during a time of radical change. 
Furthermore, they cast light on the contested, and often contradictory, role played by these 








In January 1962, the Southern Rhodesian business periodical Rhodesian Property & Finance 
published an article on its front page titled: ‘Mystery of S.R. gold mine’s “vanished” 
reserves’.1 The piece examined the 1960-61 annual reports of Kanyemba Gold Mines Ltd., 
which contained ‘certain conflicting figures’.2 The article suggested that many small 
shareholders had accepted the claim made in the 1960 annual report that the mine possessed 
‘the official “expectation” of twenty years of “proved” ore reserves’, only to find out a year 
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later that its adjusted life was a mere eighteen months. This revelation had seen the 
company’s shares slump from £1 to 2s. 6d. each.3 After reading the article, Roland ‘Tiny’ 
Rowland, Lonrho’s joint managing-director in Salisbury, was incensed and attempted to 
speak with the magazine’s editor, Wilfred Brooks, on the telephone. Brooks refused to take 
Rowland’s first two calls but relented at Rowland’s third attempt. Brooks would later recall 
how Rowland’s voice was ‘quivering with angry affront’ as they discussed the article. 
Brooks, in an attempt to defuse the conversation, then interjected: ‘you seem to think, Mr. 
Rowland, that our analysis was a personal attack; but as you know, I have never had the 
pleasure of meeting you’. According to Brooks, Rowland’s temperament changed instantly as 
he responded ‘Oh, yes Mr. Brooks … that is exactly why I am inviting you to discuss the 
matter personally with me’.4  
The following day Brooks decided to accept the invitation and crossed the street to 
Rowland’s office. Discussions over the article lasted for two hours. At one point during the 
talks, Rowland allegedly exclaimed ‘Mr. Brookes, I love Rhodesia; and I am working to 
build up Rhodesia. Yet you and a journal like Property & Finance bother about a silly little 
thing like Kanyemba!’5 Eventually Brooks offered Rowland 1,000 words to respond to the 
allegations made. Brooks’ offer was, however, on the condition that Rowland should 
personally sign the reply. Rowland reacted angrily, instructing Brooks that he was ‘not 
interested in submitting a signed statement. But what I do expect you to do Mr. Brooks, in the 
interests of Rhodesia, is to say in your next issue that, after full discussions with Mr. 
Rowland, your comments on Kenyemba were totally unjustified’.6 Brooks was appalled at 
Rowland’s suggestion and colourfully noted how ‘the picture of the gypsy fiddler (the only 
picture in the office) seemed to grin even more malevolently; and the Siamese cat on the 
cover of the only book on Mr. Rowland’s desk seemed to lick its lips with anticipation’.7 
This article traces the relationship between big business and white insecurities, as 
presented in Property & Finance, during the 1960 and 1970s. In doing so it sheds light on the 
relationship between Brooks and Rowland whose enmity was more than just a private matter. 
From 1960 until the magazine’s closure in 1976, Brooks took every opportunity available to 
castigate Lonrho and Rowland in print. These attacks reflected Brooks’ beliefs about the role 
of big business in southern Africa during a highly-contested period in the region’s history. 
The granting of independence to a vast number of colonies across Africa that started in the 
late 1950s spread to southern Africa in the 1960s, with Malawi, Zambia, Tanzania and 
Botswana awarded self-rule during that decade. The white minority government in Rhodesia, 
however, contested these changes and resisted major
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Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola. Rhodesian intransigence led to the colony’s 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965. Brooks embraced these developments 
and Property & Finance became highly politicised, extremely right wing and very populist. 
A central tenant of this populism was that big business, typified by individuals like Rowland 
and Lonrho, undermined the aspirations of ordinary white Rhodesians by making hasty and 
ill-considered deals with black nationalist leaders and movements, and putting profit before 
white interests and security.  
The potential for using Property & Finance as a lens through which to examine the 
shifting attitudes of white Rhodesian society was first hinted at in Godwin and Hancock’s 
pioneering work on Rhodesian society during the 1970s.8 References to Brooks and his 
publication’s approach to UDI are scattered through their work and offered the reader a 
tantalising glimpse of the possibilities that a systematic study of the journal offered in 
shedding new light on the complexities of Rhodesian settler society. More recent scholarship 
of Rhodesian settler society on this period has tended to focus on demographic change, the 
role of white women and politics or accounting for the high political manoeuvres of the rebel 
regime and the British state.9 This article charts a different course, using Property & Finance 
to explore key divisions within the white community during a time of radical change.  
 
Wilfred Brooks and the Establishment of Property & Finance 
Wilfred Brooks moved to Rhodesia in 1948 from South Africa, having been born in Essex, 
England in 1915. He already had an established career working in newspapers and journals in 
Cape Town, Johannesburg and Pretoria before the Second World War. After the war and until 
released from service, he was a member of the special staff in Germany training local 
journalists.10 Once demobilised, he worked in the London office of Argus South Africa 
newspapers. He returned to Africa to pursue his business interests and moved to Rhodesia 
shortly after, settling in Bulawayo.11 There, he became very active in local politics. By 1954 
he was chairman of the Hillside (a suburb in Bulawayo) branch of the United Rhodesia Party; 
chairman of the Hillside Ratepayers Association, secretary of the Umguza (a district in the 
province of Matabeleland North and close to Bulawayo) branch of the Federal Party; 
chairman of the Publicity Committee ‘Boost Bulawayo’ campaign and a member of the 
Bulawayo Civic and Ratepayers Association.12 In 1954 he stood as a United Federal Party 
(UFP) candidate for the territorial parliament, but lost.13  
 The rise in economic activity in the Federation opened up opportunities for dedicated 
publications for the business sector. To this end, Gerrard Aberman, who had long been 
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involved in numerous periodicals, established the journal Rhodesian Property & Finance in 
1956.14 Initially, Property & Finance was a monthly periodical focused on property sales and 
management issues within Salisbury, the capital of Southern Rhodesia. The readership of the 
magazine grew fast as it filled a niche that many in the business community found useful. By 
1958, Property & Finance could state that it had the largest paid circulation of any monthly 
business or trade journal in the Federation, with over 80% prepaid annual subscribers and was 
read by ‘most industrialists, managers, officials and even the Prime Minister of the 
Federation’.15 The success of the journal resulted in its expansion and rapid growth and Brooks 
was appointed as managing-editor in 1959.16 As Property & Finance grew, it began to devote 
more coverage to general business, rural issues, and ‘also national affairs, especially as 
political developments impinged increasingly on economic and business prospects’.17 By 1962 
it had the highest paid circulation of any business periodical in central Africa, as assessed by 
the Audit Bureau of Circulations of South Africa. By 1971, it claimed a monthly distribution to 
41,000 readers, which increased to 52,000 in 1975 and 71,000 in 1977.18  
 Brooks wrote all the political and political-economic commentaries for the magazine 
until its closure in 1977. Typically, each issue of the magazine contained a long and 
investigative piece discussing developments and highlights of the previous month, along with 
general business and property coverage. These pieces, composed by Brooks, offer a key to 
understanding his thinking and political sympathies. In 1959 Brooks was very clearly in the 
‘liberal’ camp, holding the belief that Africans deserved political and economic freedoms, in 
order to maintain a level of racial partnership. By 1962, however, this outlook had changed 
radically. With the collapse of the Central African Federation in December 1963 and the 
spread of independence across much of Africa, Brooks felt that white interests in Africa were 
under attack. Brooks became much more conservative, right wing and overtly racist.19 This 
shift coincided with the rise of the Rhodesian Front (RF). Brooks actively encouraged his 
readers to back the party in their bid to stop majority rule and ensure continued white control 
of Southern Rhodesia.20 Wilfred Brooks also supported the ascendency of Ian Smith to leader 
of the RF and the push for UDI in 1965. By the end of the 1960s, however, Brooks felt that 
Smith was a fraud who had betrayed white interests in Rhodesia. He accused him of holding 
secret talks with British and nationalist leaders in which he undermined the future prospects of 
white settlers. Brooks resigned from the RF and became an active supporter of a number of 
radical opposition movements, such as the extremely right-wing Southern African Solidarity 




The Populist Shift in Property & Finance  
Property & Finance found an audience through reflecting popular white concerns. As Patrick 
Bond observed, political sensibilities of various sectors of the white community in Rhodesia 
were often dictated by their economic position. Industrial and financial capitalists saw the 
need for the expansion of a black middle class to provide a growing domestic market. Other 
whites, however, particularly urban, small-scale capitalists and waged workers, were 
concerned about growing African urban populations. The main concerns centred on possible 
rising labour costs, competition in the work place, sharing amenities and being unable to keep 
black populations in check.22 It is this second camp that Brooks and Property & Finance 
appealed to in the 1960s. Consequently, the liberal messages that Brooks promoted in the 
1950s disappeared and were replaced by a staunch defence of white rights and interests, 
intermixed with derogatory statements on African capabilities, potential and worth.  
Part of this shift resulted in a reframing of foreign capital and big business in Property 
& Finance. Brooks sought to establish a greater connection with, what he called, the 
‘ordinary man in the street’, meaning white urban Rhodesians not associated with big 
capital.23 Brooks attempted, through Property & Finance, to connect with local and regional 
white audiences trying to make sense of the changes occurring in the region. The magazine 
tapped into white fears of what could happen with the process of decolonisation that was 
underway. Brooks supported the RF, Ian Smith and UDI in 1965, because he felt that this was 
the best course of action to secure the futures and interests of white Rhodesians. As Arrighi 
has noted, UDI, in its initial conception, ‘was directed as much against large-scale capitalism 
as against the Africans. The populist undertones of the UDI campaign were very 
noticeable’.24 Brooks encapsulated those populist undertones and used his magazine to 
promote and disseminate this discourse. The shift of Brooks and his utterances in Property & 
Finance support such Arrighi’s claim and also illustrate how powerful this message was.  
As part of his populist stance, Brooks raised questions over the role of big business in 
the politics of the day. These concerns saw Property & Finance attack a number of large 
corporations, including Lonrho.25 In July 1960, Brooks had written that it was no secret that 
‘powerful business interests, shocked and angry at circumstances leading to the Southern 
Rhodesia riots last month [July 1960], have been exerting pressure on the Government to 
reassess the political situation’.26 By 1963, this pressure had become too much for Brooks. In 
response to the intrusion of big capital into the political jostling at the time, Brooks became 
more defensive of small capitalists and white workers. In January Brooks assured his readers 
that Property & Finance was there to that look out for the little man, Rhodesians who made 
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Rhodesia and had to live here and deal with the ‘African’.27 This populist stance, at odds with 
Brooks’ earlier writings on big business, became a mainstay of the magazine. Brooks warned 
businesses that had been involved with African independence leaders: ‘Powerful companies, 
who have been flirting with the nationalist parties in the north, may well live to regret their 
expediency’.28 This jibe was directed at Rowland and Lonrho in particular. By late 1963 
Brooks felt that:  
Business has swung in support of the ordinary [white] man-in-the-street, whose 
attitudes are quite clear: he has tried to meet Pan-Africanism half-way; he has 
accepted what (in Southern Africa) is a radical constitution; he has gone about his 
daily business, in complete confidence that he as a moral as well as a demonstrable 
case after 40 years or reasonable and pretty fair self-government; and he has not the 
slightest intention of appeasing more, until he sees what happens in the African 
territories to the north of him.29 
 
Property & Finance had clearly changed and the tone and focus of the magazine had shifted 
radically from its earlier stance. As the threats of majority rule and African takeover grew, 
Brooks began to see the big corporations such as Lonrho and the Anglo American 
Corporation (Anglo) in cahoots with the Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU), which he felt 
was anti-white and threating to a continued white presence on the continent. These apparent 
links, and the threat they posed, became the key focus of Brooks’ offensive against big 
capital and big business.  
Brooks’ political commentary caused friction with the periodical’s owner, Gerrard 
Aberman. So much so that in 1967, Brooks tendered his resignation over an attack of the 
magazine by the then Minister of Information, Mr. Howman, and the lack of support he felt 
he had received from his proprietor. Brooks then sought to establish a rival fortnightly 
publication, with backing from an investment consultant, Mr. N.E. Oldenburg. A consortium 
of local businessmen, however, backed by 400 Rhodesian investors, established the 
Rhodesian Newspapers Trust, which purchased Property & Finance in November and 
promptly reinstated Brooks as the editor.30 The magazine now proudly proclaimed on its 
cover that it was ‘owned, financed and controlled in Rhodesia. Supported by “Friends of 
Rhodesia” abroad’.31 A director of Property & Finance later noted that when the Trust 
purchased the paper, they informed Brooks that he would have editorial freedom with regard 
to economic and financial content, ‘but he was to restricted to non-party-political comment, 
since we did not want to become associated with either side of the political spectrum’.32 
Brooks, however, ignored these warnings and continued to castigate many in the RF, 
including Smith. Some board members were embarrassed by these attacks and Brooks was 
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asked to leave, however a cabal of more right-wing colleagues staged an intervention to have 
Brooks reinstated. The original Trust then sold Property & Finance to a newly incorporated 
company, which was ‘entirely Rhodesian’. Brooks now had free reign to tout his political 
message, which he dressed up as ‘fully Rhodesian owned’, and putting ‘Rhodesia First’, to tie 
into his popular positioning.33 To Brooks these qualities represented everything Lonrho’s 
managing-director lacked. 
 
Lonrho and ‘Tiny’ Rowland 
‘Tiny’ Rowland moved to Southern Rhodesia in 1948. After settling in Gatooma, Rowland 
set about developing his business interests in a holding company called Shepton Estates. ‘By 
around 1958’, as Richard Hall, the editor of the Lonrho-owed Times of Zambia in the 1960s 
later recalled,  
there was some awareness in Salisbury that a formidable – and rather disturbing – 
personality had arrived on the financial scene. Rowland was enigmatic; he was not a 
clubbable man. There were even rumours put about that he was a homosexual. His 
dealings were being remarked upon in local business journals; sometimes the 
inferences were harsh. He paid no heed: his astuteness had earned him access to funds 
in Johannesburg when credit was hard to come by in Salisbury.34 
 
Rowland’s first visit to Kanyemba, referred to in the introduction, during 1958 was later 
recalled by Ken Adams, the mine’s manager, who saw ‘a Rolls Royce Silver Cloud 
manoeuvre over the dirt track road towards the mine … From the car, a tall man in a City-
style tweed suit, waistcoat and monogrammed silk shirt emerged’.35 It was clear to Adams 
that Rowland had little knowledge of gold mining. The Rhodesia Selection Trust (RST) 
group had initially held an option on the mine, however, its chairman Sir Ronald Prain 
decided against exercising it in 1958 after receiving a negative survey of the mine’s prospects 
from the group’s consulting geologist. Soon afterwards the mine piqued the interest of 
Rowland who swiftly purchased Kanyemba and also struck a deal to secure the adjacent 
Hepworth mine.  
Rowland’s intention was to float the two mines on the Johannesburg stock exchange, 
yet to do so successfully he needed a positive report from an independent consulting 
engineer. Rowland settled on a South African mining engineer named Roelof Radmeyer who 
had developed an expertise in surveying coalmines but had little experience of gold workings. 
Radmeyer’s brief had been identical to that of RST’s consulting engineer but his conclusions 
could not have been more different. He failed to mention the previous report at all and 
Radmeyer’s own report was liberally sprinkled with optimistic phrases. With the report 
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secured, Rowland issued 1.5 million shares with a value of £450,000. This was virtually 
double the amount that Rowland had paid for the two mines. He retained 60 per cent of the 
shares and offered the public 600,000 shares at 37.5 pence. Rowland would later transfer his 
shareholding to Lonrho as part of his appointment package in 1962.36 
 As The Financial Times would later note Lonrho was ‘never an easy company for the 
outsider to fathom’ yet it was clear for all to see that its profits before tax had risen from 
£158,000 in 1961 to £16.275 millon in 1970.37 The change in the company’s fortunes was 
driven by Rowland’s willingness to ‘take a chance in newly independent African countries 
where established business had become nervous about the future’.38 Rowland’s decision to 
expand Lonrho’s interests outside of Rhodesia was timely, given UDI. This severely affected 
Lonrho’s ability to operate in the colony, not least when oil sanctions led to the closure of its 
newly opened pipeline between Umtali and Beira on the Mozambique coast.39 On the second 
day of the rebellion, Rowland flew to Zambia where he registered himself as a Zambian 
resident to obtain a British passport, and promptly relocated to London.40 By 1968, Rowland 
was downplaying Lonrho’s links with white minority-ruled southern Africa, suggesting that it 
was only a ‘historical accident’ that it still possessed assets in Rhodesia.41 During 1972 
Rowland went as far as to suggest that Lonrho was prepared to sell its assets in Southern 
Africa, yet this soon changed in 1974 after its South African platinum mines in Rustenburg 
began to turn a handsome profit.42 It is clear to see why Rowland’s ideological flexibility in 
combination with, in the words of The Economist, his ‘larger than life’ personality that 
‘resists being tied to conventions and regular expense accounting rather like a roguish hero 
from a novel about the British Empire’, led to Brooks’ distrust.43 
 As the existing literature makes clear, Lonrho under Rowland had expanded its 
interests across the African continent rapidly in the 1960s.44 Brooks recognising the 
company’s rapid growth snidely reported that ‘Lonrho is bidding fair to become a second-
class Anglo American Corporation’. In the same article Brooks did astutely note that 
Lonrho’s ‘insatiable appetite for take-overs and new ventures’ had placed a considerable 
strain on the company’s financial resources’. He speculated that Lonrho would not be ‘the 
first conglomerate to run into difficulties through an excess of what one, of kind, could 
describe as enthusiasm’.45 Brooks proved prescient when in the early 1970s Lonrho faced a 
liquidity crisis and a sharply falling share price. This led to the attempt in 1973 by eight of 




Rowland had previously managed to utilise the backing he enjoyed from Lonrho’s 
small shareholders to destroy the coup at a special shareholders’ meeting, held at Central Hall 
in Westminster on 5 May. In response to reports on the meeting coming out of London, 
Property & Finance contended that although ‘Mr. Rowland’s ability, as a latter day Caesar, 
to provide bread for his avid shareholders is still a subject of argument, there was no doubt 
about the quality of the special general meeting and stormy agm’.47 It continued by 
suggesting that ‘never has a business event caught the public imagination more; for the 
occasion was the culmination of a story of intrigue, mystery, assassinations, Big Money, 
greed, ambition, and all the other ingredients of a modern power game reminiscent of 
mediaeval times’.48  
Lonrho’s chairman, Duncan Sandys, did not fare well in Property & Finance’s 
coverage. The former Colonial Secretary was described as ‘gazing absently around the hall 
like some dried-up Latin master who had long lost control of the class’. Sandys’ day appeared 
to go from bad to worse, the article contended that ‘wearing a bemused expression the aging 
Mr. Sandys managed to lose his place in the agenda; confused the names of his many fellow 
directors, ruled himself out of order, and was unable to decide who had the floor’. The 
following paragraph merely stated, ‘not surprisingly, his future as chairman is in doubt’.49 
When Rowland rose to speak, he received, in the words of the Daily Telegraph, ‘an ovation 
of the sort that is normally accorded to opera singers or Cup-Final winners’. Property & 
Finance accused Rowland of ‘blandly ignoring the charges of mismanagement, secrecy, and 
financial juggling’ before noting that Rowland’s approach to the whole affair came ‘more in 
sorrow than in anger’. The journal grudgingly conceded that Rowland produced ‘a masterly 
performance of low-key technique, all was reasonableness; not a sign was there of the 
ruthless semi-violent streak of which his directors had complained’.50 To one later 
commentator, the decision by Lonrho’s small shareholders to back Rowland against the 
wishes of the City establishment and much of the financial press suggested that ‘in the age of 
corporatism, Rowland was a latter day Barney Barnato … a capitalist hero’.51 
In addition to Rowland’s willingness to deceive Lonrho’s Rhodesian shareholders 
Brooks also took issue with Lonrho’s disposition to engage with newly independent African 
nations. A clear example can be seen with Rowland’s attitude towards the OAU. The Yom 
Kippur War in the Middle East during October 1973 saw the both the price of oil and anti-
western sentiment in the Afro-Asian world escalate dramatically. Fresh from his victory in 
the attempted boardroom coup, Rowland approached the OAU with a proposal. Rowland 
suggested that the organisation’s members should source their own oil directly from the 
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Middle East, using Lonrho as the broker and shipper. This would enable the African states to 
shed their dependence on western oil corporations. Rowland had previously intimated his 
desire to become involved with the OAU, as Property & Finance was to remind its readers, 
reporting that Rowland had proclaimed in the early 1970s that ‘Southern Africa will be black 
Africa in 10 to 15 years’.52 The OAU appointed a sub-committee to consider the effects of 
the oil embargo during an Extraordinary Session held in Addis Ababa in November 1973.53 
Dr Mansour Khaled, Sudan’s Foreign Minister, was elected chairman with a remit to ensure 
the continued flow of oil to OAU countries, in addition to fostering greater financial and 
technical cooperation between African and Arab states.  
During its first meeting the committee authorised the OAU Secretary-General, Nzo 
Ekangaki, to engage consultants to assist in the technical aspects of securing the transport, 
storage and distribution of petroleum. Ekangaki approached Lonrho. At the committee’s 
second meeting on 20 January 1974 he stressed that Lonrho enjoyed ‘close connections with 
the Arab oil producing countries’, so much so that the Egyptian President Anwar el Sadat had 
agreed that Lonrho could employee his former Minister of Petroleum to oversee the contract. 
According the weekly news magazine West Africa, the terms of the contract ‘were met with 
some demur’, however given that Ekangaki had signed a contract with Rowland on 11 
January the committee was ‘thus presented with a fait accompli’. Yet concern arose over 
Lonrho’s interests in South Africa and Rhodesia.54 As news of Lonrho’s appointment spread, 
however, there was a chorus of complaints from many OAU members. This led Ekangaki to 
threaten to resign if his decision to appoint Lonrho was not supported. It was clear, however, 
that Lonrho’s position was untenable and eventually the contract was cancelled at Lonrho’s 
request.55 
Lonrho’s flirtation with the OAU was enough for Brooks to insert an editorial 
comment into the front page story of the July 1973 issue to ‘prompt the question whether 
[Rowland] or Lonrho’s continued operations in this country are in the national interest?’56 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the article which spanned three pages came to the conclusion that 
‘Lonrho’s operations, here or elsewhere, are not in fact in the real interests of this country’.57 
It therefore suggested that ‘few Rhodesian tears should be shed over any misfortunes that he 
or the group may well still encounter, especially in the sphere of international politics’.58 
Three years later Property & Finance was still questioning ‘Lonrho’s continued 
invulnerability in Rhodesia despite strong criticism (from many quarters) of its support for 
the OAU and Black Rule’. The column continued by highlighting speculation that Ian Smith 
had, ‘reached a secret understanding with the British Government’ to not interfere with 
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British investment in Rhodesia, as ‘part of the price of British willingness to participate in 
settlement talks’. This criticism was not solely reserved for Lonrho. The article then 
suggested that any such agreement may explain why ‘Anglo American Corporation and 
similar multinationals have been able to defy the expressed wishes of the Rhodesian 
electorate with impunity’.59 The intention behind this accusation was not only to be damaging 
to Lonrho and multinational business in general. It was also intended to damage Ian Smith 
and it should be noted that Smith had recently issued Property & Finance and Brooks 
personally, a summons claiming $25,000 in damages after the publication in the February 
1976 issue of an article entitled ‘Smith’s Bungling Mafia’.60 
Brooks had Property & Finance continue its investigation into the influence in 
Rhodesian politics in what it termed ‘Big Money’ in its August 1976 issue. In a two-pronged 
attack on multinational business and Ian Smith, the front-page article suggested that recent 
controls imposed on Rhodesians wishing to take money out of the country would have been 
entirely ‘unnecessary if the Prime Minister [Smith] and his colleagues had taken resolute 
action years ago against, for example, the Pro-OAU and scandal ridden Lonrho’. As a result 
of this inaction, the journal contended that the Rhodesian Front was ‘no longer a Party of the 
small man, in business and otherwise: it allowed its leaders to manoeuvre it into the financial 
big league of near faceless men’ and as a result Rhodesia had become a ‘shabby, fifth rate 
and left leaning autocracy’.61 
 
Attacks on Large-Scale Businesses in Property & Finance 
Brooks’ general fear of large-scale business enterprise without firm Rhodesian roots was not 
confined to Lonrho, as can be seen through his coverage of RST and Anglo. Initially, as 
detailed above, both Brooks and RST had been very supportive of Federation, but by the end 
of the 1950s the company was publically voicing misgivings about the political trajectory of 
Federation.62 RST’s chairman Sir Ronald Prain publically stated that his main objection was 
that there was a desperate need to provide for an African political majority, ‘in practice and in 
theory’. In December 1959, Brooks, in agreement with Prain, stated that ‘the longer a 
solution of basic [racial] problems is delayed, the higher will be the price exacted by events’. 
This prophetic statement outlined Brooks’ early belief in the need for African economic and 
political advancement. At the same time, however, he also outlined his ideas of what of 
‘liberalism’ and ‘partnership’ were:  
But let there be no illusion either, among Africans about the meaning of 
“partnership”. The concept is harsh: it means every man, having been given the 
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opportunity, can have no legitimate come-back and must stand on his own feet. It 
does not mean the politically-easy granting to the African of the means to spend 
money, which he cannot afford, on expensive European liquor or on large numbers of 
sweepstake tickets; but it does mean the opportunity, without paternal coddling, to 
earn the higher incomes which can buy not only these and other commodities but also 
a wider realisation that the material prosperity does not come without a payment of a 
price in effort and in some sacrifice of the personal liberty of the kraal.63 
 
These comments, and Brooks’ early foray into Federal and local politics, reflected Brooks’ 
‘liberal’ standing at the time. The United Rhodesia Party (URP) was, from 1953, led by Sir 
Garfield Todd. Despite his liberal reputation, Todd introduced a range of repressive and 
restrictive legislation that adversely affected many Africans.64 Nevertheless, he is widely 
regarded as a liberalising force, who was keen to offer improvements for Africans, 
specifically in terms of health and education.65 Todd promoted the ideas of multiracialism 
and African social, political and economic advancement, but at an extremely slow pace and 
Africans were clearly regarded as junior partners.66 By 1958, the URP had become the United 
Federal Party (UFP) and was in command of the Federation. Todd pursued his liberal agenda 
with too much vigour and was accused by many in his own party of being ‘out of step with 
public opinion’.67 He was forced to resign as Prime Minister and left the UFP.68 Brooks was 
genuinely involved in liberal politics of the time and was rumoured to have written speeches 
for Todd and was even spoken of as his ‘private secretary’.69 Brooks resigned from the UFP 
following Todd’s example and became a member of the Capricorn Society and the Central 
Africa Party.70  
Yet by 1962, Brooks’ political views had shifted dramatically. Concerned with events 
in other parts of Africa where colonial powers had withdrawn, Brooks began to fear for the 
future of whites on the continent. By 1962 it was clear that Federation was to dissolve and 
that Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia were to be given independence. Brooks’ belief in the 
capabilities of Africans eroded, and he moved politically to the right. To this end, he no 
longer supported black advancement in any form and sought to limit the concessions white 
Rhodesians would make in the event of the end of the Federation. Brooks joined the RF and 
supported calls for independence for Southern Rhodesia with white settler rule.71 This 
coincided with the change in his views on the role of big business and he made it clear to the 
readers of Property & Finance that the privileging of race in the Rhodesias was not 
businesses’ primary concern.  
Anglo held an ambiguous position in the eyes of Brooks.72 In 1968, Property & 
Finance reported positively that Anglo American ‘are known to have emphasised the facts of 
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life [in Rhodesia] to the London politicians’.73 Anglo’s South African heritage perhaps 
helped to reassure Brooks that they had an understanding of the Rhodesian situation unlike 
RST or Lonrho. There was, however, a sign of things to come with the accusation that Anglo 
‘have acquired increasing influence over Mr Smith and his Ministers as well’.74 The coverage 
of Anglo remained positive throughout the 1960s, with Property & Finance recommending 
Anglo ‘as a must for local investors who want a truly international spread.75  
This support ended abruptly following the Pearce Commission in 1972.76 Brooks, 
appalled by the proposals, attacked Sir Frederick Crawford, a director of Anglo and former 
British Governor of Uganda who had urged their acceptance.77 Two months later he declared 
all-out war on both Ian Smith and Harry Oppenheimer in an article titled ‘Smith Must Go!’. 
To Brooks it was ‘white liberalism, as exemplified by Mr. Oppenheimer, which whets Black 
political appetite’.78 Brooks’ decision to highlight white liberalism reflected his belief of the 
dangers posed to Rhodesian society by the adoption of policies that would move towards 
gradual racial integration.79 In the following issue, Brooks expanded on this point suggesting 
that Anglo ‘never miss a trick in attempting, as in South Africa, to use their business and 
financial influence as a basis for undeviating attempts, either through newspapers or 
otherwise, to influence public opinion on political matters – invariably to the radical Left’.80 
The article explicitly links Anglo with Lonrho by suggesting that both groups ‘subtly … 
dabble in matters that they should be careful to eschew as nominees of international interests 
with little sympathy for the White man’s struggle for survival in a sub-continent that (mines 
and all) he has created’.81  
Liberalism featured prominently in a Property & Finance article in 1973. In the 
January issue, Brooks argued that ‘as the Federal boom in Rhodesia proved, there is nothing 
like material prosperity to blunt political awareness: during the extraordinary Federal episode, 
Rhodesians were induced to accept multiracial concepts that they would never have dreamed 
of before’. Brooks again demonstrated his distrust of multinational business and its influence 
on the press, claiming that ‘the power of international financial groups was unsurpassed, 
especially as it controlled most of the opinion-forming media and the governing party’.82 This 
was followed in the May issue with a reminder to the readers of Property & Finance that Sir 
Roy Welensky was a close friend of Crawford and that Oppenheimer ‘a backer of the ultra-
liberal Progressive Party in South Africa’, influences the main Rhodesian newspapers, 
through his shareholding in the Argus Group.83 
Brooks’ distrust of Anglo, the Oppenheimer family and South African capital in 
general grew in 1974 in response to the policy of détente that was introduced by the Prime 
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Minister of South Africa, B. J. Vorster. Through détente, South Africa attempted to improve 
its relations with African controlled frontline states to try and stabilise the region and control 
the spread of dissent and African resistance. Southern Rhodesia was a major test for détente, 
as the frontline states keen on a peaceful resolution to the conflict there sought assurances 
from Vorster he would intervene on the side of Rhodesian African nationalists. Vorster, 
somewhat surprisingly, applied substantial pressure on Smith to force him to the negotiating 
table, by withdrawing South African military forces and by slowing road and rail traffic 
through Rhodesia.84 Smith saw these moves as ‘the great betrayal’.85 Brooks, unsurprisingly, 
was rather unimpressed by these manoeuvres and saw Oppenheimer as directly responsible 
for influencing the actions of both Vorster and President Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia.86 
Brooks also believed that Smith had made secret deals with the British, the South Africans 
and other multinational companies. Indeed, Brooks felt that ‘two of the main beneficiaries of 
détente and Settlement would be the Anglo American Corporation and Lonrho’.87 To this 
end, ‘Mr. Oppenheimer and his Anglo American Corporation are exerting all their influence 
to induce the country to accept Black Rule is inevitable’.88 These multinationals were 
pursuing business interests and profits at the expense of political sensibility, and at the 
expense of ordinary whites in Southern Africa. In an exposé of Smith’s secret negotiations 
with powerful businesses, Brooks concluded that Smith assisting in undermining white 
economic interests for the benefits of ‘copper-barons’ who would swoop in and purchase 
these interests on the cheap after the introduction of African majority rule:  
Although all the assets of individual White enterprise have been stripped, or are in the 
last stages of stripping, the international copper-barons (Anglo American and RST) 
have not only received generous compensation, but have been allowed to keep more 
than a foot in the door: they or their nominees remain the power behind the shaky 
throne, the conductors of the pro-Kaunda choir, and the prime manipulators of pro-
Détente and pro-Settlement politicians.89 
 
Brooks’ View on the Changing Nature of Capitalism in the Region   
Brooks’ fear of large-scale business came to the fore in the April 1974 issue of Property & 
Finance.90 An article discussed the ‘increasing public resentment over present day trends in 
capitalist business’ in Britain and explicitly suggested that the same developments were also 
apparent in Rhodesia. It was based on reports of the recent Conservative Party conference in 
Britain where ‘the phrase “unacceptable face” was heard repeatedly. To one speaker, the 
picture often painted of the economy being governed by “asset-strippers, barely out of 
puberty, displacing workers from their jobs as a daily occurrence, closing factories, living in 
company mansions at Shareholders’ expense and receiving payments via tax havens, to the 
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detriment of the Exchequer” was a “cruel falsehood”’. The very next speaker, however, 
appeared less convinced, claiming that ‘take-overs leading to increased private monopoly; 
supranational corporations acting without regard to the national interest or to the welfare of 
their local employees – those are aspects which we ignore at our own peril’. It is clear from 
the pages of Property & Finance over the previous decade that Brooks was more in sympathy 
with the latter view.  
 The article quoted Angus Maude, the Conservative Member of Parliament for 
Stratford-upon-Avon, who claimed that when he viewed the banks’ profit figures he asked 
himself ‘if these are our friends, who needs enemies?’ Maude linked his view to a shift in the 
nature of capitalism taking place in the early 1970s. He suggested that even ‘experienced and 
respected industrialists’ were ‘much less frightened, now, of being taken over by the State … 
than they were of being taken over and sacked by some slick City whiz-kid.’ There was 
therefore ‘disquiet’ that ‘present day capitalism was creating disproportionate rewards for the 
few, whether they were the directors of Lonrho, young entrepreneurs financed by the City of 
London, or the shareholders of big banks or property companies’.91  
 Property & Finance under Brooks’ editorship clearly saw Rowland’s Lonrho as an 
unreliable Rhodesian business concern. Brooks had no love for the more establishment 
capitalism practiced by Anglo and RST, but his criticisms of Lonrho were often couched in 
accusations of skulduggery or illegality. The image Rowland and the press created was that 
of the outsider, of someone challenging the accepted ways of doing business. As The 
Financial Times reflected on 5 February 1973, Rowland was ‘a man with a swashbuckling 
attitude to the usual business methods, legendary contacts with African leaders and a Midas 
touch for swelling Lonrho’s fortunes’.92 His victory over the ‘straight eight’ in the attempted 
boardroom coup seemed to underline the shift in power away from respectable establishment 
figures towards a new breed of capitalists, personified by Rowland, Jim Slater and James 
Goldsmith.93 Brooks’ distrust echoes a wider concern, as evidenced by Maude’s speech, of 
the changing nature of western capitalism in the early 1970s. In August 1971 when 
Management Today published its annual City Growth League, the major gains were for 
comparatively new concerns, including Rowland’s Lonrho. The magazine’s editor reflected 
on this change, suggesting that the ‘pickings have gone to self-made, sharp-eyed men who 
have muscled in on institutional territory and have extended that terrain beyond the dreams of 
the lifetime career employees of the City’s marble halls’.94 This refiguring of global 
capitalism saw Brooks openly despair over its influence in Rhodesia. Having opened with the 
claim that ‘White Rhodesia is essentially a middle-class state’, he went on to quote an 
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American journalist at length who linked both ‘super-capitalism’ and communism as 
‘international’ claiming that ‘there is no room under either system for free labour or for the 
free enterprise small businessman’.95  
Brooks’ decision to publish this piece at length also reflects his unease about the 
changing nature of capitalism in Rhodesia and its connections to the global capitalist 
economy. Peter Cain and Tony Hopkins have famously explored the connections between the 
City of London and the expansion and retraction of British imperialism.96 They stress that by 
the early 1970s Britain had lost its imperial powerbase and saw its economy threatened by the 
end of the post-war boom and inflation aggravated by the oil shocks in 1973. The Rhodesian 
economy experienced similar conditions in the 1970s, contracting with both the global 
recession in 1971 and the oil shocks during 1973. These events brought the sustained 
economic growth from the late 1960s to an end and as the Rhodesian Minister of Commerce 
was to observe, ‘we have to run faster merely to stay in the same place’.97 
By 1975 Brooks’ paranoia knew no bounds. No longer content with exposing how 
multinationals were undermining white influence in Southern Africa, Brooks began 
publishing a wide range of outlandish conspiracy theories involving some of the biggest 
names in global finance. One of the most prominent of these was the Rockefeller family. 
Brooks claimed the Rockefellers had set up the framework of the United Nations, an 
organisation as bad as the OAU in his eyes, ‘and the family now promotes aid to all the 
enemies of Southern Africa and of the West’.98 He also accused the Rockefellers of long 
established links with the communist world (China, Russia and the Viet-Cong) and suggested 
they were intent on ensuring the success of communist backed black nationalist groups in 
Southern Africa. In addition, David Rockefeller had long been ‘in the van on détente not only 
with Russia, but also with Red China’.99  
These exposés of the Rockefeller family illustrated another of Brooks’ conspiracy 
links; a fear of Jewish connections to both communism and global financial manipulation. In 
one article on the Bilderberg Group, still a popular target of conspiracy theorists today, 
Brooks identified a host of Jewish protagonists who had jeopardised Southern Rhodesia’s 
independence and outlined their role in a global conspiracy.100 The Beits and the 
Oppenheimers had help the Bilderberg group establish in Southern Africa with the lure of 
gold and diamonds. Since then Jewish controlled corporations like Anglo and the Englehard 
Minerals and Chemical Corporation, had been assisted by people from the Rockefellers, the 
Rothschilds and other powerful Jews. The key, of course, in the 1970s was none other than 
Henry Kissinger, ‘the most dominant of all Rockefeller protégées and a former refugee from 
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pre-War Germany’.101 Undeniably, many of these claims and supposed links were pure fancy 
and impossible to substantiate. They fitted into Brooks’ fears and beliefs about the rapidly 
changing economic and political situation of Southern Africa. These anti-Semitic undertones 
proved popular at the time and connected to a much longer history of anti-Jewish 
discrimination in the region. Harry Oppenheimer’s father Ernest had been depicted as 
‘Hoggenheimer the Jew’ in a pamphlet distributed by striking white miners in South Africa in 
the 1920s.102 More recently, Sir Roy Welensky had been defeated by the RF’s Clifford 
Dupont in the 1964 Arundel by-election in a campaign mired in crude anti-Semitism.103 
By 1972, Property & Finance’s readership had grown to 41,000 readers, which 
further increased to 52,000 in 1975 and 71,000 in 1977. His radical and conspiracy laden 
assessments of the regional and global situation were very popular with his readers. Partly 
this was due to the unpredictability of the war in Rhodesia and what form of political survival 
whites would have. But it was also an attempt to identify those responsible for the fall out in 
Southern Rhodesia and to lay blame at the feet of others. Brooks made the problems in 
Rhodesia the cause of people like Oppenheimer and Rowland, who were connected to such 
unsavoury elements as nationalist leaders, the OAU, communists, international capital and 
the Jews. This message was well received by ‘ordinary’ Rhodesians as it exempted them 
from blame and put the responsibility elsewhere. While the readership of Property & Finance 
expanded, the magazine lost advertisers. Smith and the RF put pressure on businesses who 
advertised in Property & Finance to withdraw their business. As a result of falling revenues, 
the magazine shrunk dramatically in size (from an average of 70 pages per issue in the late 
1960s, to 44 pages in 1971, to 20 pages in 1975. Colour printing disappeared and the quality 
of the newsprint fell dramatically. The message and discourse in Property & Finance not 
only connected with local audiences, but also similar ones in South Africa, where middle and 
lower class whites were also concerned for their political and economic futures. Then, in the 
1970s, Brooks began calling Smith a ‘sell-out’. Smith successfully sued Brooks in a civil case 
for defamation, after which Brooks left for South Africa. Of the case, Godwin and Hancock 
noted:  
Whether or not Smith wanted him silenced, Brooks believed that the libel suit and the 
cancellation of advertisements in Property and Finance were all part of a communist 
conspiracy to destroy the right. The court case began on 6 June 1976, the day after 
Brooks heard that his son had been accidentally killed while on active service with a 
PATU [Police Anti-Terrorist Unit] stick. The defendant refused the offer of an 
adjournment and, according to his own version, addressed Mr Justice Pittman as 
follows: I have been stripped of my paper, my company, my son; and now I face 
personal ruin. I have nothing more to lose – or to be taken; but for my son’s sake 
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alone, and for the sake of many sons, I appear today. He is probably fortunate to be 
out of the political cesspool that is our – once – beautiful Rhodesia.104 
 
After the court case, Property & Finance closed down. Brooks tried to establish a new 
publication, titled The Rhodesian Patriot, a very small, modestly produced newsletter 
proclaiming to be ‘a monthly Newsletter replacing Property & Finance as the White Voice of 
Rhodesia’.105 The Rhodesian Patriot was incendiary and failed to find advertisers and financial 
support. It only lasted eight months and ceased publishing in March 1978. Brooks left 
Rhodesia for Cape Town, South Africa, shortly after, where he committed suicide in 1984.106  
 
Conclusion  
In the August 1975 issue of Property & Finance Wilfred Brooks reminded his readers that 
‘Tiny’ Rowland had ‘made no secret’ of his support for the OAU and of his ‘even more 
fervent hope that Rhodesia becomes Zimbabwe’. Brooks suggested to his readers that such an 
eventuality may reveal a ‘hidden quid pro quo’ asking ‘has not “Tiny” prospered, in the past 
decade or more, from judicious fishing in murky black political waters?’107 This article has 
traced the development of a popular and widespread mistrust of large-scale capitalism, and its 
potential for disloyalty to the post-1965 Rhodesian state, by the white middle class and small-
scale capitalists in Rhodesia through the pages of Property & Finance. A close reading of the 
periodical from the early 1960s suggests that a general fear of large-scale business enterprise 
without firm Rhodesian roots increasingly developed. This was exemplified through the 
relationship between Wilfred Brooks and the Lonrho chief, ‘Tiny’ Rowland. Brooks’ attitude 
towards Rowland and Lonrho was shaped by two main features: his distrust of large-scale 
business and Rowland’s desire to expand his businesses into independent Africa. Brooks’ 
attitudes towards the political situation in Rhodesia evolved over time, becoming more 
radical and right wing as the 1960s and 1970s progressed. Yet in the case of both Rowland 
and Lonrho his views remained remarkably consistent. This reflects that fact that one would 
be hard pushed to see Rowland’s business decisions as being nothing more self-interested. 
Rowland, who had never been truly accepted by Rhodesian society, was ahead of the curve in 
recognising during the dying days of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland that the 
future of the continent lay in majority, rather than minority rule. By the mid-1970s Brooks’ 
paranoia was such that he saw conspiracies everywhere and it was no great leap for him to 
suggest tacit links between the Rhodesian Front, the British government and Lonrho. This 
point was clearly evidenced in July 1976 when Property & Finance reported: 
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Lonrho’s continued invulnerability in Rhodesia despite strong criticism … of its 
support for the OAU and Black Rule, has aroused speculation on whether, years ago, 
Mr. Smith might have reached a secret understanding with the British Government 
not in any way to interfere with British investment in his country, as part of the price 
of British willingness to participate in “Settlement” Talks … The opinion is held that 
the existence of any such understanding might also help explain why Anglo American 
Corporation and other such multinationals (whether connected with it or not) have 
been able to defy the expressed wishes of the Rhodesian electorate with impunity.108 
 
Brooks took an ever more conspiratorial approach to understanding the nature of Rhodesia’s 
move towards majority rule in the 1970s which had the effect of reducing Property & 
Finance’s advertising revenue while boosting their readership. And Property & Finance’s 
readership was phenomenal in the mid-1970s. It was widely distributed and read across 
Rhodesia, and had audiences in Zambia and South Africa too. Brooks attempt to connect to 
‘ordinary’ Rhodesians, as opposed to capitalists and big business, illustrates of one of the key 
divisions within the white community during a time of radical change. It suggests that large-
scale capital and the elites of white society were far better placed to navigate the choppy 
waters of political change than Brooks’ idealised ‘man-on-the-street’. The former, Brooks 
believed, were guilt of committing the cardinal sin of placing profit and self-interest before 
race, while the latter tried to keep intact white rule and racial solidarity that was undermined 
by the shady deals of politicians and businessmen over whom they had little control.  
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